Building Bridges out of Barricades

On February 6, 1996 at 0700 hours, John Miranda, a 6'5", 260 lb. Hawaiian male with a record for violence and under the influence of Aice@ and cocaine, walked into his former work site with a 12 gauge Winchester pump shotgun loaded with eight slugs.

He took five hostages and then when Honolulu police showed up he fired two rounds at them and a third into the leg of Guy George, the owner of the store. Miranda then phoned a local radio station and told them that someone was going to die. He then taped the shotgun to the head of one of the hostages and walked outside to look for Guy George who had managed to escape. The police were then able to talk to Miranda for several hours who demanded that $20,000 be taken to a location and thrown into the air in support of the Hawaiian Movement for Solidarity.

After eight hours of negotiation, Miranda began a countdown from A60". At about A18", the hostage ducked and spun, at which time Miranda was shot by police snipers. The hostage had one scratch and Miranda was D.O.A. Two weeks after the incident, Miranda=s girlfriend=s body was found; he had killed her before the siege.

On January 16, 1996, a series of robberies ended in a high speed chase with police following the suspect vehicle for 120 miles on Interstate 5 in California. The suspects, Qin Duk, a 38 year old Vietnamese Army Veteran and John Colandro, a 21 year old Filipino, fired on and hit several police vehicles. The chase ended with a collision in downtown Los Angeles at 1630 hours and the gunfight continued as suspects ran into the Hall of Records building and took a female security guard hostage. Duk made initial demands of $500,000 and an armoured truck. Much later in the negotiations he demanded Coca-Cola which was delivered to the suspects. Negotiations took a turn when Colandro accidentally shot himself in the foot. The negotiators suggested that he come out with the hostage and get medical aid but Duk refused to allow it.

Negotiations continued with Duk and he was talked into "saving face" so he could surrender. At 0100 hours, the suspects surrendered. Duk later said that the negotiators confused him into surrendering and he wished he could have died in the Hall of Records building; he later hanged himself in jail.

Despite the violence exhibited in some of these scenarios, the fact that so many hostage/barricade incidents end peacefully is directly attributed to relationship building and communication with the hostage-taker/barricaded person.

The study analyzed the critical incidents within law enforcement responses to barricaded subjects and suicidal persons and determine what facilitates or hinders success in crisis negotiation. Flanagan's (1954) Critical Incident Analysis methodology was used to investigate how police crisis negotiators "build bridges out of barricades". The results indicate that the following factors can contribute to either successor failure: Teamwork, active listening, relationship building, logistics, building a bridge, leadership, learning and development, using intuition, negotiator's personal resources, providing information and direction, support, and time. The results also indicate that success in crisis negotiation can be hindered by the subject's orientation and the subject's behavior. These are elements that can clearly be influenced by the negotiator but are outside of his/her direct control.

There was a strong emphasis on teamwork and the need to strive toward synchronizing the effort of command, tactical, and negotiation units to form a unified crisis response team. The dominance of this category seems to emanate from the continued presence of tension between these units and the desire of negotiators to present a unified presence so that a bridge can be built from chaos to a calm, safe environment.

Implications for theory and research

The results of this study confirm what is being taught in negotiation courses and what is being published in police journals. There is a clear correspondence between what was found in this study and what has been written in these journals and in negotiator publications. This study provides an empirical basis for what has been previously described by SSA (ret'd) Frederick Lanceley as "journal articles on hostage/crisis negotiation that, rather than advancing the field of negotiation, recount 'war stories' or restate what most of us learned in our basic negotiation course" (McMains & Mullins, 1996, p.v). This empirical base is paramount but does not discount the value of the journal articles that are written by seasoned negotiators. The correlation between the results of this study and the publications by negotiators validates their message.

As we move away from the focus of psychopathology, I would caution that we do not follow the pendulum completely away from this area. We can learn much about subject behavior by understanding personality disorder and mental illness. There is also a body of research on psychopathy and the prediction of violence (Hart & Hare, 1996; Webster 'et al', 1997) that is worthy of attention. With the statistics being gathered through the FBI HOBAS system and with an expansion of that system I can foresee developing an instrument similar to the HCR-20 (Webster 'et al') for assessing risk of forcible confinement. This measure could be used with an incarcerated population and then could be accessed by law enforcement outside of corrections when a parolee is entering the community. This study would not only target those at high risk of involvement in a barricade situation but would also assist in developing a profile(s) that would enable a better understanding of the barricaded subject.

This study is part of a growing trend of hostage negotiation research toward a theoretical approach that utilizes the theory behind conflict management. After all, hostage negotiation was always the management of conflict. Educators in this field have been tapping into theories of influence, persuasion, and social learning. The research performed by the Harvard Negotiation Project that resulted in such rich and informative writing by Ury (1981), Fisher & Brown (1988), and Ury (1991) has become an integral part of the negotiator training. The work of Miron & Goldstein (1979), as it relates to the instrumental and expressive behavior of hostage takers, has moved the research past the study of psychopathology. The recent works of McMains & Mullins (1996), and Webster (1997 and 2000) have integrated theory and research with practice and have enriched the field. Empirical research, most of which is directed to examining statistics related to typology and logistics, is still helpful and these very legitimate areas of research dovetail very well with the more qualitative research that examines constructs of communication and relationship building.

There are some subject areas that emerged from this research that require further exploration. The two categories of Using Intuition and Negotiator's Personal Resources are relatively new to this literature and must be examined for value related to selection and training of crisis negotiators. The elements within categories that emerged as relatively new to this body of literature were (a) distracting, (b) demystifying, and (c) disengaging (walking away).

Knowing when and how to provide a distraction that would sidetrack the subject from a violent intent is another intuitive skill that was used positively by some of the participants. Sidetracking seems to allow for the anger to diffuse as the focus of the subject is not being fueled by negative stimulus, at least for the distracted period of time.

There is also merit in learning techniques of distracting in order for tactical movement and intervention to take place. The negotiator awareness of when this tactical intervention is inevitable should be clear to the negotiator, not by notification from the tactical team, but through the tactical awareness maintained by the negotiator. Another attribute of a good negotiator is to maintain this tactical awareness, both for personal safety and the safety of everyone engaged in the incident.

Providing information and "demystifying" the crisis negotiation process was found to be very helpful in resolving situations. Participants found that often the subject was afraid to come out because they did not know what to expect or that expectations were that they would be hurt or killed by police. Assuring the subjects that they would be safe, and taking the mystique out of the presence of armed tactical officers dressed in army fatigues or camouflage, was helpful in allaying fear. Explaining the need for containment and the need to keep everyone safe does not take away from the tactical positioning but it explains its presence. It is apparent from this study that one of the obstacles to those on the other side of the barricade in coming out peacefully is the fear of the unknown. Participants found that taking the mystique out of the police presence made it easier to build a bridge out of the barricade. Explaining the surrender procedure by detailing what the subject would see and what the tactical team would do seemed to "demystify" the process and build some trust between the subject and the negotiator. If the subject believes that the "others" out there are as professional and caring as the negotiator, then the walk out there becomes safe and feasible.

This element of "disengaging" or leaving the conflict after engaging is especially germane in its implications for litigation and media spotlight. The consideration of disengaging is a topic that is overdue and most negotiators can recall a scenario where the question of "why are we here right now?" should have been asked. It is indeed a credit to those who have asked the question, assessed the situation, and made the decision to disengage. It is hoped that its presence in this study will highlight it as a consideration to be applied and to be researched for effectiveness and legal ramifications.

There is a piece of research that has not yet been accessed. This study represents the first part and the second piece is waiting to be done. It is the same study of "what facilitates or hinders successful crisis negotiation" but the research sample is "the other side of the barricade". Perhaps this has never been studied because nobody thought of asking the "perpetrator" why he decided to surrender to police. Maybe there is a feeling that we can't trust the "bad guy" to give us a reliable answer. Could it be that the perception of the subject on "the other side of the barricade" is that he is a "bad guy" and we can't be learning from the perpetrators? Further research from the other perspective is recommended.
Implications for negotiation practice

The field of crisis management is on center stage. The orchestra is comprised of incident commanders, crisis negotiators, tactical personnel, first responders, telecom operators, technical support, translators, educators, researchers, and consulting mental health professionals. It is no longer acceptable to "wing ding some nice little ditty" and hope that we sound okay. The world is watching and the media ensures that what we do is broadcast in full colour and sound. Death Review Boards and Coroner's Jury are seated and ready to hear how we have been selected for the orchestra, how we have trained, and what theories and pieces of empirical research do we use for composition of the music? When the concert begins do we have a conductor and does the conductor know the music or does a member of the orchestra have to enlighten him between stanzas? Have we all practiced together so we know what this will sound like and do we all have the same piece of music or are we playing different versions of the same tune? As we play, why does the percussion section sound so loud and why are they playing a march when the clarinets are playing a lullaby?

The category system derived from this study calls for the need to work as a team, to communicate as a team, to train as a team, and to synchronize the effort of tactical and negotiation. It calls for negotiators to develop attributes that allow them to be good listeners, empathetic, caring, calm, intuitive, willing to integrate their training and to learn from experience. It calls for them to use time to build relationships through affinity, cultural understanding, and communication that reduces fear by explaining and demystifying the process. It calls for negotiators to use intelligence and third parties to co-construct a bridge out of the barricade by minimizing risk and damage and to create an environment of empowerment so the subject can walk across the bridge without losing face. It calls for leadership, not by rank, but by being a person with experience, credibility, and possessing the attributes of a good negotiator. It calls for an ability to assess a situation by asking "why are we here?" and making the decision to walk away if the assessment answer is "we can deal with this in a more effective manner by leaving right now".

It calls for a pursuit of knowledge and a thirst to not only acquire the tools of active listening and relationship building, but to develop personally so that these tools will be more than skills but will be personal attributes. One of the key pieces that became evident to the researcher during the review of taped interviews and incident extraction was that much of the process that facilitated success was due to the resources and personalities of the negotiators. What draws them to negotiation is not the number of tools they can carry in a toolbox but that they (the negotiators) are the toolboxes and they handcraft the tools that they use through caring for other people and having the desire that "everyone goes home safe tonight".

Whether this desire is expressed as spiritual, intellectually challenging, humanistic or a combination of reasons, it is abundantly clear that helping others is the primary motivation for doing this job. It is this motivation that is heard as the underlying message of care and concern by the subject on the other side of the barricade. It is this motivation that keeps the negotiators striving for the goal of peaceful resolution and allows them to focus their attention on the subject for 12 hours and explain that it felt like an hour or two.

The attribute of being empathic and being an empathic listener is a stretch for negotiators, but a necessary stretch. McMains and Mullins (1996), in the introduction of their Crisis Negotiations book, raise a valid point and a hurdle for most negotiators in stating that "the approach negotiators take with hostage takers is diametrically opposed to the approach police are supposed to use. Instead of asserting the authority and power of the badgeYnegotiators become the ally of the criminal and talk him into deciding to peacefully surrender."

Being "soft" with the "bad guy" does not come naturally for police officers but those that are successful investigators, interviewers, and source developers understand the value of an empathic approach. The character quality that I refer to as "tendertoughness" is a key quality for the police officer, and especially the crisis negotiator, to develop. It is a quality that I see in many of this nation's law enforcement officers who are called upon to be both tender and tough.

Empathy involves sensitively and accurately trying to understand another from the other's own point of view. Developing empathy nurtures the tender side; the tough side is usually already present, as many spouses can confirm. The good news is that the ability to be accurately empathic is something that can be developed by training and can be learned most rapidly in an empathic climate from empathic teachers or supervisors. Empathic listening and understanding is a requisite ability to crisis negotiation for these reasons: (a) it dissolves alienation, (b) it absorbs tension, (c) the recipient feels valued and cared for, and (d) it is the most potent element in bringing mental health patients, specifically schizophrenics, out of their estrangement (Rogers, 1980).

It calls for an openness to learn from others, including the subject in our negotiations. The rule of "we don't talk to them after the incident" may have to be abolished or modified when we see rationale for the change. Perhaps someone else could debrief the subject but we must be open to learn what made them react or respond during our negotiations. A few participants make a point of debriefing the subject while other participants use third party intermediaries and others would consider a hostage exchange. These are three factors that would never have been considered in the past, but today, with due diligence, these are considerations and have been used in a manner that has facilitated success.

The word "success" is used subjectively. A "successful negotiation" is defined in this study as a conclusion to a negotiated incident where negotiation was used to preserve life and minimize human casualty. The "success" is also in the process which moves the subject away from an evil intent, even if only temporarily. The "talks failed and we were forced to go tactical" is erroneous. Negotiations didn't fail, the subject made a decision to act in a different manner. The fact that communication existed at all in some of these cases is a success. On the lighter side, may I suggest the fact that the jumper didn't land on anyone is a measure of success!

Unfortunately, as related by participant #14 and #20, there is a "ball score mentality" that says that if you don't win, you lose. This mentality can have an adverse effect on a negotiator who did everything humanly possible but the subject decided to end his life. For a negotiator to get up in front of hundreds of negotiators and boast about how many "successful" negotiations his or her department has had over the years without a single casualty is foolish and presumptuous. This mentality can be very devastating to the negotiator who "lost" and the "what if's" that seem to visit that negotiator can be a serious hindrance to their effectiveness as a negotiator, if not to their own mental health.

The findings of this study contribute to the practice of crisis negotiation by confirming the necessity of teamwork and reinforcing the value of integrated training. They confirm active listening as the vehicle for effective communication across the barricade. They illuminate the value of a selection criteria that will capture the personal resources that a candidate can bring to negotiation and his/her ability to integrate learning and experience in a self renewal process. The findings reinforce the value of relationship building that creates trust that serves as the foundation for the bridge that is co-constructed out of the barricades.


Note: The complete study (204 pages) can be made available by contacting the author at Matt.Logan@rcmp-grc.gc.ca

Author's Note:
I defended this doctoral dissertation on the morning of September 11, 2001. I salute my fellow Law Enforcement Officers who gave their lives while the sky was falling and dedicate this document to them. I wish to acknowledge my fellow crisis negotiators who "listen" and prevent "the sky from falling" around the world.

A special acknowledgment to my participants who shared their story and spoke for us all. Thank you to Assistant Commissioner Pat Cummins who had the vision to initiate the Operational Psychologist position in the RCMP and to Inspector Dan Killam who supported this research. Appreciation to Lt. Bob Lozito of the Sacramento County Sheriff Dept., Sgt. Mary Dunnigan of the San Francisco P.D., and to Lt. Mel Blizzard of the Baltimore County P.D. for their support and assistance in data collection.

Dr. Matt Logan completed a Ph.D. in Counselling Psychology at the University of British Columbia with a focus on Crisis (Hostage) Negotiation and Major Criminal Conflict Management. He has been a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for 23 years serving in five communities within British Columbia and a tour of duty in Ottawa and at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. Matt was working as a Psychologist with Correctional Services Canada (CSC) from May, 1999 to November, 2001 where he did Psychological Risk Assessments for the National Parole Board and worked in therapy with predatory sex offenders. He is currently working in Behavioural Sciences at the RCMP Pacific Region Headquarters in Vancouver.

As Psychologist in Major Crime, Sgt. Logan is involved as a consultant to Serious Crime Sections, Undercover Unit, Interview Team, and Crisis Negotiation Teams. Psychological Risk and Threat Assessments are provided on suspects in serious crime investigations. An FBI trained hostage negotiator, Dr. Logan is a conference speaker and facilitator specializing in Conflict and Crisis Management, Psychopathy, and Trauma.

Sgt. Logan has worked with the International Association Chiefs of Police (IACP) in developing leadership programs for policing and is a visiting professor at the University of Victoria and Trinity Western University, teaching on the MA in Leadership programs. He has published articles on operational and leadership issues related to policing.

Dr. Logan was recently named to the Professional Advisory Board for North America’s first Ph.D Program in Police Psychology at Saybrook Graduate School in San Francisco, California.